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CAVEAT EM[PTOR: WILL THE A.L.I. ERODE
STRICT LIABILITY IN THE RESTATEMENT
(THIIRD) FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY?
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you very much Professor Twerski. I have a question for
you which I will save until the question period. The next speaker
will be John Vargo, a practicing attorney.
Mr. John Vargo*:
Professor Twerski, I hope I do not add to your pain but there is
going to be considerable disagreement with your position on sec-
tion 402A. 1 I hope there is no offense to Judge Pratt in his re-
* Partner, Pardieck, Gill, & Vargo, Indianapolis, Indiana; Adjunct
Professor of Law, Bond University School of Law, Queensland, Australia;
J.D., Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis; author of more than 30
articles; Editor-in-Chief of five-volume treatise entitled Products Liability
Practice Guide, published by Matthew Bender.
1. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1512, 1514 (1993). The authors suggest the following revisions to
§ 402A:
Special Liability of One Who Sells a Defective Product
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property proximately caused by the
product defect if the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a claim based
on a
(a) manufacturing defect even though the seller exercised all
possible care in the preparation and marketing of the product;
or
(b) design defect only if the foreseeable risks of harm presented by
the product, when and as marketed, could have been reduced
at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a safer design;
or
(c) warning defect only if the seller failed to provide reasonable
instructions or warnings about nonobvious product-related
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marks which indicated a concern with economics and its effect on
the manufacturer. What we have lost sight of in the last fifteen
years is another huge group, the consumers, and the economic
effect on this group.2 I have read with great interest the Cornell
Id. Professors Henderson and Twerski, as co-reporters for the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, take the position that they are attempting to change the
standard from strict liability to negligence for design defect and failure to warn
cases. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This
provision provides in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
Id.
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c. Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was originally drafted as a method of
protection for the consumer against defective products. Comment c provides in
relevant part:
[Tihe public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and
be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can
be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons
to afford it are those who market the products.
Id.; see also David A. Fischer, Products Liability - The Meaning of Dfect, 39
Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974) (stating that when the risk of danger is high,
"most private consumers will not be able to bear the cost . . . ."); Frank J.
Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and
Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 77 (1982) (stating that the test set forth
by Judge Learned Hand, "tends to make injurers richer at the expense of
victims . . ").
2
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article by Professors Twerski and Henderson 3 and their other law
review articles over the last ten years.4 As reporters for the Re-
statement Third on Products Liability, Professors Henderson and
Twerski have stated that they are attempting to write a draft that
reflects what they believe is a consensus or the majority position
of the courts. 5 However, Professors Henderson and Twerski's
position is, in my view, simply a return to negligence. I would
take the same position as a famous judge who said "I dissent for
reasons stated by the majority." 6 I believe the Restatement under
section 402A should remain one of strict liability in all its forms,
including those for warnings.
Professor Jerry Phillips has submitted to the reporters what I
consider is a true restatement which sets forth strict liability. 7
3. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1.
4. Since 1983, Professor Twerski's articles have indicated a shift towards
the concerns of the manufacturer and away from the concerns of the consumer.
5. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513.
6. The author is not referring to a specific case, but rather to a phrase
used by many attorneys and judges to express the view that the majority has
not grasped the point.
7. RESTATEtENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Proposed Redraft 1993)
The draft states:
(1) One who supplies a defective product is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by the product defect if the supplier
is engaged in the business of supplying products of the kind
having the product defect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a claim based
on a defective product even though the supplier exercised all
possible care in the manufacture or marketing of the product.
(3) For purposes of Subsection (1) a defective product means a product
that
(a) is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the product was
made,
(b) does not meet the expectations of the ordinary person,
(c) because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the
market by a reasonably prudent supplier assuming he knew
of its dangerous condition,
(d) is unduly dangerous,
(e) can practicably be made safer,
(f) has a practical substitute, or
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There are good reasons why strict liability should be the rule, and
there are many inappropriate reasons why strict liability has been
rejected by some scholars and courts. 8 I would like to point out a
few since I may not get to all of them in the short time allowed.
What distinguishes strict liability from negligence?9 It is very
simple. One must impute the knowledge of the relevant danger or
The above list of factors is not intended to be exclusive. A product
may be defective if one or more of the above or other relevant
factors applies.
(4) A determination of product defect shall be based on all relevant
evidence as of the date of trial.
Id. Other examples of product-related terms that are multi-definitional include
"merchantability" and "abnormally dangerous activities." See also UCC § 2-
314(2) (1993). Section 2-314(2) describes merchantable goods as those which
at least:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the
agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged,
and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the
promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
Id.
8. See generally Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death
of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
1183, 1206-13 (1992).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965).
Comment a provides in pertinent part: "The rule is one of strict liability,
making the seller subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he
has exercised all possible care in preparation and sale of the product." Id.;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) provides in pertinent part:
"[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." Id. Negligence as
defined above
[D]oes not include acts which, although done with every precaution
which it is practicable to demand, involve an irreducible minimum of
danger to others, but which are so far justified by their utility or by
traditional usage that even the most perfect system of preventative law
would not forbid them. These may for convenience be termed "acts
which create a strict liability."
4
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defect at the time of trial to the manufacturer. 10 That is it. How
have some courts accomplished the imposition of strict liability?
This has been done by several means. First is Phillips v. Kim-
wood Machine Co., 11 where the court imputed knowledge of the
product's danger to the manufacturer, then asked whether the
manufacturer was negligent for marketing the product in its
original form. 12 After you impute knowledge, all you have left is
traditional negligence principles. 13 The other method of
achieving strict liability is by employing the consumer
expectation test. 14 This is a simple test. If the product does not
conform to what a reasonable consumer expects, then the product
is defective. 15 If it does conform to such expectations, the
10. Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984). The
Petty court stated that an action based on strict liability focuses on the product,
not on the manufacturer's conduct or knowledge. Id. To focus on whether the
product is defective or not the courts have imputed the knowledge of the risk
of danger to the manufacturer. Id.; Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
737 F.2d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that in Louisiana the manufacturer
is presumed to know the defects of its products); Seefeld v. Crown, Cork &
Seal Co. Inc., 779 F. Supp. 461, 464 (D. Minn. 1991) ("the distinction
between strict liability and negligence in... failure to warn cases is that in
strict liability, knowledge of the condition of the product and the risks
involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer, whereas in
negligence these elements must be proven.").
11. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
12. Id. at 1036. Strict products liability involves imposing constructive
knowledge of a product's defective condition and then evaluating the
reasonableness of placing such product into the stream of commerce. Id. See
also Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1196. "[The Phillips doctrine, which is
essentially a risk/utility balancing test, directs the court or jury to decide
whether assuming knowledge, the manufacturer should have been selling the
product, in the form in which it was being marketed." Id.
13. See Wertheimer, supra note 8 at 1036. "The test.., is whether the
seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved."
Id
14. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
TORTS § 99, at 698 (5th ed. 1984). "[A] product is defectively dangerous if it
is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchased it with the ordinary knowledge common to





Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
product is not defective. 16 There are, however, several other tests
for strict liability. For example, California uses a two step
approach in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Inc., 17 which applied
the consumer expectation test and, in the alternative, applied a
risk-utility balancing test. 18
The consumer expectation test seems to be the most popular
method for achieving strict liability. 19 However, scholars recog-
16. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 F.2d 1386, 1392 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that there is no strict liability in tort for an open and obvious
danger because the product is not more dangerous than contemplated by the
consumer and "hence cannot under the consumer expectation test, applied in
Mississippi, be unreasonably dangerous .... ."); Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc.,
926 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding a "product can only be defective
when measured against a standard existing at the time of sale or against
reasonable consumer expectations held at the time of sale.").
17. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
18. Id. at 455. "A product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff
establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." i.
Alternatively, a product may be found defective by use of the risk-utility
balancing test. In this test
the jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of the
danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger
would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the
financial cost of an improved design and the adverse consequences to
the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design.
Id. at 454-55.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1977).
Comment i provides in relevant part: "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as
to its characteristic." Id.; Fischer, supra note 2, at 348 (stating that many
courts have used the consumer expectation test as a "criteria for defining
defect." If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe, it is considered
defective if it does not meet those reasonable expectations.); see also Christina
M. Moylan, li Pursuit of the Appropriate Standard of Liability for Dcfective
Product Designs, 42 ME. L. REV. 453, 458-60 (1990) (deriving the consumer
expectation test from § 402A); Wertheimer, supra note 9, at 1197-99 ("The
consumer expectation test ties the concept of defect to the reasonable
consumer's expectation of the product's safety.").
[Vol 10
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nize several problems with this test.20 What are the problems?
Under the consumer expectation test, the consumer's knowledge
is all important, whereas the manufacturer's knowledge is not
relevant. 2 1 But, the knowledge that a normal consumer has con-
cerning the qualities of a particular product creates problems in
some instances. 22 For example, the consumers' expectations may
be too low.23 When a consumer knows of the particular danger in
the product, the product may not be considered defective. 24 A
20. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 349-52. "[Ihe consumer expectations
may be too high or too low. In addition, once expectations become settled in a
manner consistent with present practice, manufacturers will have no incentive
to improve the safety of products even when feasible. This frustrates a major
policy underlying strict liability." Id.; Moylan, supra note 19, at 459. The
article stated, among other things, that the consumer expectation test has been
criticized for its lack of distinction between both negligence and warranty
theories. This test may be no different from a negligence test because an
ordinary consumer is not likely to expect more than the exercise of reasonable
care by the manufacturer. Id.
21. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1197-99 (stating that knowledge of
danger is irrelevant under consumer expectation test except as recognized by
the consumer); see also Gary D. Hermann, The Consuner Erpectation Test,
Application of a Difficult Standard for Determining Product Defects, 41 FED.
INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 251, 264 (1991) (stating "the fact that the danger is
unknown to the manufacturer does not change the fact that it makes the
product more dangerous than the consumer would expect.").
22. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194-95 (Alaska 1992)
(describing problems consumers have in forming reasonable expectations due
to lack of knowledge about prescription drugs).
23. See Fischer supra note 2, at 349-50 (discussing problems that could
arise if the consumer expectation test is used as the exclusive test in defining
defectiveness); see also David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of
Justice for the Twentieth Century, 11 PACE L. REv. 63, 80-81 (1990)
("occasionally a manufacturer is forced to disappoint a minority of consumers
who possess peculiarly high expectations of product safety or who are
particularly risk-averse, clumsy, careless or dull-witted."); John Wade, On
The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 ("In
many situations.... the consumer would not know what to expect, because he
would have no idea how safe the product could be made.").
24. See England v. Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 728 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1984);
see also Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1198 (explaining that punch press
without guard would not be defective because consumer would expect injury to
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typical example is a punch press without a guard. 25 In this situ-
ation, what fool would stick his hand into the operating area of
the press when he knows that a hand could be severed? However,
as is well known, many products can easily be guarded, and such
products would be considered defective under a risk-utility test. 26
The consumer's knowledge of a product's danger has resulted in
what some courts call the open and obvious danger rule.2 7 This
rule eliminates liability no matter what theory (strict liability or
negligence) is used.28 Another problem with the consumer expec-
tation test is when the consumer expectations are too high. 29 In
this instance, the consumer expects safety when the product can-
not possibly be made safe. 30 Finally, the consumer will fail to
establish liability under the consumer expectation test when it
25. See England, 728 F.2d at 1028; see also Hartman v. Miller Hydro
Co., 499 F.2d 191, 192 (10th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff injured by unguarded shaft
of bottle washing machine).
26. See Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1950) (plaintiff injured
hand by coming in contact with unguarded revolving rollers); but see Dorsey
v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759 (1971) (holding that danger of
unguarded rotary blade obvious to plaintiff will not automatically preclude
recovery).
27. See Weatherby v. Honda Motor Co., 393 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (under the open and obvious rule, "a product is not defective if the
absence of a safety device is open and obvious, and there is no duty to warn of
an obvious danger...."); see also Jodie L. Miner, An Analysis of Koske v.
Townsend Engineering: The Relationship Between The Open and Obvious
Danger Rule and the Consumer Expectation Test, 25 IND. L. REV. 235, 239
(1991); see generally Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability: Obviousness of
Danger Revisited, 15 IND. L. REv. 797 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America., Inc., v. Young, 321 A.2d 737,
744-45 (Md. 1974) (denying strict liability where defect in design was "patent
or obvious" to the user); Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343, 347
(Mo. 1964) (imposing liability in negligence where the construction defect was
not obvious to the user).
29. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1199 (noting that consumer
expectations may be too high "as in the case of a product which the consumer
might assume to be safe, but which cannot be made safe .... "); see also
Fischer supra note 2, at 349-50. "Expectations as to safety will not always be
in line with what the reasonable manufacturer can achieve because the average
consumer will not have the same information as experts in the field. Consumer
expectations may be too high or too low." Id.
30. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 349-50.
[Vol 10
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cannot be shown what an ordinary consumer's expectations are
concerning the product's danger.3
1
A review of the imputed knowledge rule can highlight the
competing policy issues between negligence and strict liability. 32
When a manufacturer actually knows of the danger in the product
and the plaintiff can prove such knowledge, then negligence and
strict liability are essentially equivalent. 33 However, applying
strict liability in situations where the product manufacturer has
knowledge of the defect or danger, has the beneficial effect of
relieving the plaintiff of such proof.34
Strict liability has its major benefit when the plaintiff is unable
to prove negligence (knowledge of the danger). 35 For example,
strict liability allows the finding of liability when the plaintiff
cannot prove the manufacturer was negligent in discovering the
defect in the product. 36
31. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988)
(recognizing that consumers of prescription drugs lack expectations about the
safety of such drugs unless doctor so informs individual, therefore, the
consumer expectation test is inapplicable to prescription drugs).
32. See Kisor v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding it was error for the court to refuse plaintiff's requested
instruction that the manufacturer still had a duty to warn even if it showed that
it was unaware its product was dangerous); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982) (holding question of whether
knowledge of dangers of product was scientifically available at time of
manufacture or question of whether medical community was unaware of
danger of asbestos at that time, cannot be raised as a defense in a strict liability
for failure to warn case).
33. See James C. Shubert, Jr., Uncertainty in the Courts - Should
Manufacturers be Held Liable for Failing to Warn of Scientifically
Undiscoverable Hazards?, 7 J. PROD. LIAB. 107, 110 (1984); see Wertheimer,
supra note 8, at 1192. "[M]any courts, when applying strict product liability,
have imputed the knowledge of the product's danger available at the time of
trial to the manufacturer as of the time of the product's manufacture. Once this
knowledge has been imputed, the standard is the same as a negligence
standard." Id.
34. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1193.
35. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1195.
36. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1195 ("imputation of knowledge
serves solely to relieve the plaintiff of proving an element that the plaintiff
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The essential difference between negligence and strict liability
is demonstrated by the case Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.37 When a defect or danger is unknowable or not discover-
able, the imputed knowledge rule of strict liability has its greatest
effect. 38 The Beshada case applied strict liability by imputing
knowledge of the danger to the manufacturer when such knowl-
edge was either unknowable or undiscoverable, including those
situations where the alleged defect was a failure to warn. 39 The
almost universal rejection of the imputed knowledge rule in
warning cases, 4 0 and the heavy criticism of Beshada,4 1 was due
37. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
38. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1193.
The imputation of knowledge has two results. First, the plaintiff does
not have to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in failing to
discover the danger. Second, the plaintiff does not have to prove that
the danger was, in fact, knowable or discoverable. The plaintiff simply
has to prove that the product contained the danger; the manufacturer's
knowledge of its presence is then irrebutably presumed.
Id.
39. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546-49. The Beshada court held that
manufacturers of products are liable where they fail to warn consumers of
dangers associated with the use of the manufactured product notwithstanding
whether the specific danger was knowable or discoverable given the state of art
of technology at the time of the failure to warn. Id. This decision was reasoned
by the Beshada court to best encourage the overall policies that the court was
concerned with - namely, not making innocent and injured consumers the sole
bearers of risk of injury from defective products and the sharing of this burden
by the manufacturer and their consumers through their product prices. Id. at
549.
40. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir.
1982) (recognizing that the "determination that a particular product is so
unreasonably hazardous as to require a warning of its dangers is not an
absolute. Such a determination is necessarily relative to the scientific
knowledge generally known or available to the manufacturer at the time the
product in question was sold."); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. 1979) (concluding that the duty to warn does not arise
until the manufacturer of the drug knows or should have known of the danger
involved); see also Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability -
Failure to Warn, 33 A.L.R. 368, 370 (1984) (stating that some courts hold
that "liability based upon a failure to warn users of a product's inherently
dangerous quality or characteristic may be imposed only where the
[Vol 10
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in large part by some scholars who gave arguments which
revealed only half the story about strict liability. 42 It is now time
to reveal the other half of the arguments in favor of strict
liability.
Assume the danger in a product in unknowable or undiscover-
able in a warning case.43 When strict liability is applied, you im-
pute knowledge of the danger.44 Thus, in a warning case, where
the danger in unknowable, strict liability requires the manufac-
turer to do the impossible.45 The manufacturer cannot warn about
manufacturer, distributor, or seller, as the case may be, had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous quality or characteristic.").
41. See Bermier v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534, 539 (Me. 1986)
(rejecting Beshada and adopting the foreseeability test in § 402A "that in a
warning context, actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the
manufacturer at the time of distribution is relevant in determining the
applicability of strict liability.. . ."); see also Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Corp.: Revolution - or Aberration - in Products Liability Laiv,
52 FORDHAM L. REv. 786, 791-98 (1984); William R. Murray, Jr.,
Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically
Undiscoverable Product Defects, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
71 GEO. L.J. 1635, 1646-53 (1983).
42. See generally Sheila Birbaum, Unmasking The Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REv. 593, 643 (questioning whether some courts have abandoned
the consideration of the manufacturer's conduct, for their eagerness to provide
recovery for injured plaintiffs and thereby overemphasized the risk-spreading
rationale); KEErON Er AL., supra note 14, at 698 ("It would seem to be
extending strict liability too far to require a manufacturer to bear the costs of
accidents to a few who were victimized by an unknowable risk of a good
product.").
43. See, e.g., Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Mo. 1990) (where
plaintiff suffered serious injuries during chemonuclelysis treatments to repair a
lumbar disc rupture).
44. See Menna v. Johns-Manville Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (D.
N.J. 1984) (where the court rejected the sophisticated user defense and
imputed knowledge of the danger to the suppliers who sold asbestos to the
Owens-Corning Company); see also Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1216.
"[F]ailure to warn is a strict products liability cause of action, and in strict
products liability knowledge of the danger is imputed to the manufacturer." Id.
45. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1239-40. The article points to the
differing treatment failure to warn cases receive in different jurisdictions.
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dangers that are unknown and unknowable. 4 6 The problem with
some courts, including Beshada, is the failure to admit they are
asking the impossible. Admit it! Strict liability in the warning
case of unknowable dangers asks the manufacturer to do what it
cannot do, period. 47 The failure of Beshada is the court's attempt
to avoid the obviousness of requesting the manufacturer to do
what it could not do.4 8
However, the critics of Beshada looked at only one half of the
arguments concerning the imputed knowledge rule. I believe it
was such half arguments that convinced Dean John Wade to re-
ject the rule of strict liability. 49 Also many courts rejected strict
liability in warning cases because they were convinced by argu-
ments which revealed only one half of the total picture and have
not heard the other half.50
It is true, from the manufacturer's view, that something is
wrong with strict liability since it asks the impossible.51 It is not
fair. It is illogical. But, the argument about fairness and logic is
just as valid when liability in the warning cases is observed from
the consumer's viewpoint. When a consumer is confronted with
warn case is unfair because it necessitates a manufacturer's warning of danger
of which it had no knowledge, while other courts view failure to warn cases as
a sub-species of design defect cases - the defect in question being the lack of
warning which would make the product safer for use by consumers. Id.
46. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550
(Cal. 1991) (noting that if every product without a warning were judged per se
defective a plaintiff would need only to prove an injury to recover, which
would defeat the goal of the failure to warn theory of strict liability).
47. See, e.g., id. at 550 (unfair to hold that manufacturer must warn of
something that is unknowable).
48. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1215; see also Beshada, 447 A.2d at
545-46. The Beshada court said unequivocally, "by imposing strict liability,
we are not requiring defendants to have done something that is impossible."
Id. The court continued to justify its holding that the manufacturer should be
liable for dangers that were unknowable based on policy grounds which favor
manufacturer liability, in other words, the general goals of strict liability in
products liability cases. Id.
49. John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983).
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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the danger in a product which cannot be discovered, then you are
asking the consumer to do the impossible. The danger in the
product is unknowable and undiscoverable by the consumer. It is
illogical to hold the consumers responsible in such situations. It is
not fair to the consumer. Thus, many courts, convinced by the
manufacturer's arguments, or by scholars and legal writers who
support the manufacturer's view, have only examined warning
cases from the manufacturer's viewpoint.52 Why not look at such
cases from the consumer's viewpoint? The true issue in the
warning case where the danger is unknowable or undiscoverable
is that it is impossible for both the manufacturer and the con-
sumer to discover the danger or defect. 53 When the issue is so
framed the only question remaining is one of policy; who be-
tween these two innocent parties should bear the loss? 54 If strict
liability is applied, the manufacturer will be liable.55 If negli-
gence is applied, the consumer will bear the loss.56 Under the
52. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1216 n.108. Beshada gave rise to
numerous scholarly works which discussed the unfairness to manufacturers
when they are subjected to strict liability for dangers in their products that they
could not have known about. Id. See generally Richard C. Henke & Hon. John
E. Keefe, Presumed Knowledge of Danger, 19 SEroN HALL L. REv. 174, 184
(1989) (stating that after Beshada the imputation of knowledge of danger in
failure to warn cases implies a presumption of knowledge that the product was
defective, not of the reasonable foreseeability of harm).
53. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1186-87. The author states, "because
it is oriented toward compensation and not towards fault, strict products
liability is not about blame; it is about responsibility." Id.
54. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1186-87. "As between the innocent
plaintiff and the innocent manufacturer, the choice to place the liability on the
manufacturer is not dictated by economic theory alone... it has also been
motivated by fairness." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 402A cmt. c (1965).
55. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1185 ("If the manufacturer made the
product and the product caused injury while used in a foreseeable manner, then
the manufacturer should be liable. That is the theory behind strict liability.");
Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366.(1965) "The reasons justifying strict
liability emphasize that there is something wrong, if not in the manufacturer's
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rules proposed by Professors Henderson and Twerski, negligence
is applied in situations where the danger or defect is unknowable
or undiscoverable. 57 Under their rule, the manufacturer is never
liable since the consumer always bears the loss in the unknowable
danger situation. 58
When this proposed rule is expanded to include design cases as
well as those of warnings, the bias against the consumer becomes
more evident. It is quite clear that application of negligence in a
design case will always find liability in favor of the manufacturer
and against the consumer when the danger is unknowable. 59 This
means that the costs of very certain injuries from dangerous
products are borne by the consumer. 60 Thus, whenever you hear
an argument, whether it be in your law school classroom or in
court which gives only one half of the argument about the unfair-
ness or illogic concerning the application of the imputed knowl-
edge rule from the viewpoint of the manufacturer, I am asking all
of you to please provide the other half of the argument. The ar-
guments made by the manufacturer are in fact valid; you are
asking the impossible. But, these same arguments are identical to
those that can be made by the consumer. If you add the other half
of the issue, then it is clear that you are asking the impossible of
the consumer. When viewing the imputed knowledge rule, it is
clear that you have a choice between two parties that are com-
pletely innocent. 61
56. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1270-71. "Strict liability is based on
the premise that the cost should fall on the manufacturer. Its abolition means
that the cost will fall on the consumer." Id.
57. See Wertheimer, supra note 8; see also supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
58. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1516. "[I]t seems only
just that consumers who benefit from products should share, through increases
in the prices charged for those products the burden of unavoidable injury costs
that result from undetectable manufacturing defects." id.
59. See Wertheimer, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
60. See Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 907 (Or. 1966). The court
refused to apply strict liability to manufacturers of the drug chloroquino
because of the possibility of the far-reaching consequences that might ensue
from such a decision. Id.
61. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1186-87.
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May I read a quote from Professor Wertheimer's recent article
concerning the failing of the Beshada case in recognizing this is-
sue:
In its ruling, the Beshada court used an unfortunate phrase when
it stated "[b]y imposing strict liability, we are not requiring de-
fendants to have done something that is impossible." The court
was indeed allowing defendants to be liable for not doing some-
thing that the defendants could not have done. One cannot warn
of a danger that is undiscoverable. The answer is, however, that
other goals supersede the apparent unfairness of holding a party
liable for failing to do something which that party could not have
done. The unfairness is illusory because the manufacturer, by
creating and selling the product, has in fact caused the injuries at
issue and should pay for them. If the manufacturer is not liable,
the cost will fall on the injured customer. Surely this is more in-
equitable than placing that cost on the party responsible for put-
ting the product on the market. Indeed, requiring the consumer
to absorb the cost is tantamount to requiring the consumer to
subsidize the manufacturer's costs. One can imagine a situation
in which a manufacturer produces and sells a new product that
causes unforeseen injuries. Unless knowledge of the danger is
imputed to the manufacturer, the manufacturer may make a
profit from that product in part because the manufacturer will
not have to pay the cost of the injuries. 62
There are other methods that have been employed to change the
strict liability rule into one of negligence which Professors
Henderson and Twerski allege is the majority or consensus view
of the courts. 63 If what they say in true, why has this occurred?
Maybe it is the lack of education by scholars and professors
concerning the true nature of strict liability. 64 Another possible
reason for the so-called return to negligence is the application of
62. See Wertheimer, supra note 8 (citing Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546).
63. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1513, "[Llanguage that
has been interpreted by so many courts over such a substantial period of time
cannot be cavalierly discarded." Id.
64. See generally John Vargo, Strict Liability for Products: An Achievable
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"state-of-the-art". 65 State-of-the-art is based upon a simple con-
cept. The manufacturer is not liable when the product is made as
safe as technology can make it. 66 But, strict liability can coexist
with state-of-the-art. 67 This occurs when you impute knowledge
of the danger but you do not impute knowledge of the cure. 68
Thus, even when knowledge of the danger is imputed, the
manufacturer may still be relieved of liability if there is no cure
for the danger. 69 But, the courts have gone further and have ex-
panded state-of-the-art to include the manufacturer's absence of
knowledge of the danger. 70 In such a form, state-of-the-art
65. See Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1986)
("the state-of-the-art defense require[s] that even scientific experts be unaware
of the danger, and thus the injury which plaintiff ultimately suffer[s]."); see
generally Garey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in
Strict Liability, 67 MINN. L. REV. 343 (1982); Gary C. Robb, A Practical
Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Product Liability Cases,
77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1982); Alan Calnan, Perpetuating Negligence
Principles in Strict Products Liability: The Use of State of the Art Concepts in
Design Cases, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 797 (1985).
66. See, e.g., Tioga Public School Dist. v. United States Gypsum, 984
F.2d 915, 923 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Government standards" allowing state-of-the-
art defense does not include compliance with General Services Administration
specifications); Norton v. Snapper Equip. Div. of Fuqua, 806 F.2d 1545,
1549 (11th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to show that new "dead man" devices
were available or feasible for installation on 1981 lawn mowers); In re
Asbestos Litigation, 984 F.2d 915, 923 (8th Cir. 1987) (state-of-the-art
defense available to drug manufacturers, but not to asbestos manufacturers);
Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1472 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing
Nebraska's statutory provision allowing a state-of-the-art defense).
67. See Norton, 806 F.2d at 1549; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod., 493
F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1207 ("[State-of-the-art] defense is
consistent with imputing knowledge of the product's danger because under
strict products liability, while knowledge of the product's danger is imputed,
knowledge of the cure is not.").
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965); Pegg v.
General Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074, 1082 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (stating
that a manufacturer will not be held strictly liable simply because a product is
inherently dangerous).
70. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969);
Woodhill v. Parke Davis, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (I11. 1980); Richard E. Byrne,
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transforms strict liability into negligence. 7 1 If a court interprets
state-of-the-art to mean that the manufacturer is only held to what
it knew at the time of manufacture, then you are applying negli-
gence, not strict liability72 . Thus, state-of-the-art swallows the
rule of strict liability and you are back to negligence. 73
Another method where negligence has supplanted strict liability
is through the application of "alternative feasible designs." 74 In a
Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 57 MARQ. L. REv.
660, 668 (1974).
71. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546-49 (reasoning that state-of-the-art
defense is grounded in negligence theory and denying it as a defense in
asbestos cases based on strict liability); see also Ellen Wertheimer, Azzarello
Agonistes: Bucking the Strict Products Liability Tide, 66 TEMp. L. Q. 419,
430 (1993) ("Strict products liability has been transformed into a negligence-
based doctrine by those courts that have done so in order to protect
manufacturers in cases where strict liability would be inappropriate."); Anita
Bernstein, A Model of Product Liability Reform, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 637, 659
(1993) (discussing the dilution of strict products liability doctrine by the use of
the state-of-the-art defense); David P. Griffith, Note, Product's Liability -
Negligence Presumed: An Evolution 67 TEX. L. REV. 851, 864-65 (1989)
("Courts also impose a negligence standard whenever they require plaintiffs to
prove that defendants products failed to perform in accordance with the "state-
of-the-art.").
72. See Dana K. Astrachan, Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.
Asbestos Manufacturers and Strict Liability: Just How Strict Is It?., 23 PAC.
L.J. 1807, 1856 (1992) (stating that if the defendant is able to show that the
hazards of the product were unknowable at the time of manufacture, failure to
warn actions returns to the realm of negligence); Wertheimer, supra note 71,
at 441 (finding that introducing state of the art evidence transforms strict
liability into pure negligence by displacing the focus from the product to the
manufacturer's conduct).
73. Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art
Evidence In Strict Product Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 7 (1982)
(discussing state-of-the-art evidence under a negligence theory); Griffith supra
note 71, at 865:
Negligence doctrine requires a manufacturer to act as a reasonable
person in conducting business activities, and this includes keeping
informed of and adhering to state of the art. Thus, requiring the plaintiff
to prove that the manufacturer's product did not conform with the state-
of-the-art amounts to a negligence standard.
Id.
74. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1242-44; James A. Henderson, Jr.,
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design case, some courts require the plaintiff to prove an alterna-
tive feasible design. 75 This requires the plaintiff to prove that a
feasible alternative design existed at the time the allegedly defec-
tive product was manufactured. 76 This, in reality, is requiring the
plaintiff to redesign the product with the knowledge of the indus-
try that existed at the time of manufacture. 77 This knowledge in-
cludes the knowledge of the danger at the time of manufacture;
thus, liability is based upon negligence, not strict liability. 78
There are other methods that have been used over the last
fifteen years to change the rule of strict liability to that of
negligence, however, time prevents full and complete
explanations of such methods in this short presentation. However,
I will touch upon a few of these methods.
One common method is to separate defects into convenient, le-
gal cubbyholes and, after such separation, to apply different stan-
Products Liability System, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 845, 850 (1983) ("In
substance, if not in form, I am proposing a negligence test for design defect
cases .... The plaintiff should be required to show that his loss was
avoidable.., by an alternative design .... ").
75. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978); but see Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.,
407 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Minn. 1987) (where the court decided that the plaintiff
was not required to show proof that an alternative feasible design existed).
76. See, e.g., Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir.
1991) (stating that in order to impose liability on a manufacturer for design
defect an "alternative, feasible, safer design" must have existed at the time of
manufacture. "If no such alternative feasible design existed when the product
was manufactured, then the design cannot be said to be 'defective' .... );
Huddell, 537 F.2d at 737 (requiring that plaintiff "offer proof of an
alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances" when showing
defective design).
77. See, e.g., Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1327 (plaintiff had expert witnesses
testify as to alternative airplane engines available at time of manufacture to
help "redesign" the airplane that had crashed).
78. See Wertheimer supra note 8, at 1243,
[T]he alternative feasible design doctrine transforms products liability
into a negligence-based doctrine by focusing on the time of manufacture
as the relevant period for availability of the alternative. The doctrine
asks whether it was feasible to redesign the product, in light of the state
of industry knowledge at the time of manufacture.
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dards of liability to each category. 79 For example, warning de-
fects have been artificially separated from design defects. 80 Once
separated, some jurisdictions apply negligence in the warning
case because they have been convinced by the one half argument
or half of the story concerning knowledge of the danger. 8 1 At the
same time, these courts will apply strict liability in the design
case. 82 Thus, the court applies a "stricter" standard in the design
case which may appear illogical. When confronted with the il-
logic of applying different standards in warning and design cases,
the court may adopt a uniform standard of negligence in all
79. See William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products
Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 782-83 (1983) (testing for defectiveness by
separating defects into three categories then applying different theories for
recovery to each category).
80. See Williamson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 968 F.2d 380, 384 (3d Cir.
1992) (stating that a product can be defective under strict liability either
because of the way it was designed or because of the failure to provide
instructions); Linegar v. Armour of America, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1152 (8th
Cir. 1990) (stating "Itbhe strict liability theory is further divided into liability
for defective design of a product and liability for failure to warn of an inherent
danger in the product .... "); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168,
1173 (Colo. 1993) (to establish liability under § 402A plaintiff must show the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous but to prove a failure to
warn case plaintiff must show a particular risk was known or knowable in light
of recognized knowledge available at time of manufacture).
81. See Grasmick v. Otis Elevator Co., 817 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding negligent failure to warn is one part of negligence but where a
manufacturer knows or should know of unreasonable dangers associated with
the use of its product it has a duty to warn of these dangers); Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986) aff'd, 758 P.2d
206 (Kan. 1988) (holding that in a negligence action we focus on defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted unreasonably "in light
of known or constructively known risks .... ."); Feldman v. Lederle Lab.,
479 A.2d 374, 452 (N.J. 1984) (stating that warnings, generally should be
measured by knowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the product).
82. See Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., No. 92-3626, 1993 WL 328402 (8th
Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (Missouri law recognizes both recovery under strict
liability for defective design and a cause of action for negligent failure to
warn); Grasmick, 817 F.2d at 90 (holding strict liability and negligence
theories are distinct theories and may be alleged in that same action); Feldman,
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cases. 83 Thus, in my opinion, by artificially dividing defects into
the traditional categories--manufacturing, design and warnings
and applying different standards to each category, some courts
may allow the negligence exception to swallow up the strict li-
ability rule.
The same method used in allowing the application of negli-
gence in warning cases to subsume application of strict liability in
design cases may allow the elimination of strict liability in
manufacturing defect cases. 84 Professors Henderson and Twerski
basically propose that strict liability be applied in manufacturing
defect cases but negligence be applied in design and warning
cases. 85 Thus, I predict that the same fate could follow, even in
83. See Parker v. Olfa Corp., 709 F. Supp 794, 796 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
The Parker court found that
[ilmposing a negligence standard for design defect litigation is only to
define in a coherent fashion what our litigants in this case are in fact
arguing and what our jurors are in essence analyzing. Thus, we adopt,
forthrightly, a pure negligence risk utility test in products liability
actions against manufacturers of products where liability is predicated
upon defective design.
Id.; see also Miller v. Todd, 518 N.E.2d 1124, 1139 (Ind. 1990) (holding that
"general negligence principles apply to impose liability when unreasonable
risk of injury is created by the manufacturer's design ... ."); Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 560 (Ind. App. 1979)
(holding that "where the duty to warn is under consideration, the standard of
strict liability is essentially similar to the standard for establishing
negligence. ... "); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Mich.
1984). The Prentis court found that in cases against a manufacturer for
defective design, the process used in the past may have served to confuse
rather than enlighten the jurors. Id. Imposing a negligent standard for design
defect litigation is only to define in a coherent fashion what our litigants in this
case are in fact arguing. Id.
84. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the standard of strict liability or negligence is similar such that
"failure to give an explicit strict liability instruction [where negligence
instruction was given] is unlikely to be reversible error .... ").
85. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1515. Professors
Henderson and Twerski stated that "manufacturing defects are dangerous
departures from a product's intended design, and ... occur in a small
percentage of units in a product line." Id. Moreover, "a seller of any product
containing a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort .,. regardless of the
plaintiff's ability to maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action." Id.
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the manufacturing defect case; negligence would become the
rule.86 Another problem with the application of differing stan-
dards applied to defect categories is that the categories are artifi-
cial concepts that, on many occasions, have little to do with real-
ity. Almost all of us have accepted the traditional three categories
of defect. 87 But, as originally conceived, warnings were consid-
ered part of the design process. 88 I believe Professor Twerski, in
some of his original writings at Cornell, has stated that warnings
are part of the design process, 89 as has Dean John Wade90 and
Professor Wertheimer. 91 In addition, as a result of my personal
experience in teaching products liability at the Society of Auto-
motive Engineers (SAE), for the past eleven years in this country
and overseas, it is clear that the engineers who design products
Since the theory of strict products liability for manufacturing defects is
difficult to apply to design or warning defects, most courts use a different
standard when dealing with design and warning cases. Id. at 1515-16.
However, Professors Henderson and Twerski have taken "no explicit position"
as to "whether design and warning defects are governed by strict liability," but
do argue that by imposing strict liability on manufacturing defects "achieve all
the policy benefits... [while presenting) no downside costs." Id. at 1530-31.
86. *Author's Comment: If the courts apply a different standard in
warning and design cases and accept the "unfairness argument" as outlined in
the text accompanying notes (79-83) supra, then it is a very simple step to
accept the argument that strict liability should be eliminated in manufacturing
defect cases. The argument could proceed very logically because a court could
ask, since a manufacturing defect only involves a very small number of cases,
why should we go to the effort of applying strict liability in the few, rare
instances of a manufacturing defect? It would be much simpler for the courts to
accept negligence in all cases once strict liability is eliminated for design
defects. Thus, like dominoes, strict liability would fall as a result of the first
push-artificial division of product defects into categories, leading to
application of negligence in warning cases then to design cases and, finally, to
manufacturing defect cases.
87. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 14, at 695-98.
88. See Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1202 n.65; see also Wade supra note
49, at 740-41; Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate
Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969).
89. See Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability - Design Defect Litigation Cones of Age, 61 CoRNEIL L.
REv. 495 (1976).
90. See Wade, supra note 49, at 740.
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treat warnings as part of the design process. Whenever an
engineer applies Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or
Fault Tree Analysis in the design process, they do not make
distinctions between the different types of defects and uniformly
treat warnings as part of the design. 92
In fact all three artificially created defect categories are ex-
tremely difficult to distinguish. For example, in Professor Oscar
Gray's home state of Maryland there is a case we have used for
almost eleven years as an example at SAE--Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., Inc. v Wisniewski. 93 In Wisniewski, the plaintiff
proceeded through an "S" turn at twenty-five mph on a Harley-
Davidson Motorcycle. 94 As he went around the turn, his throttle
control handle slipped off the bar; the plaintiff lost control and
crossed the center line, crashing into an oncoming car. 95 The
plaintiff sued Harley-Davidson, and the evidence at trial showed
that a "C" clamp holding the throttle control to the handle bars of
the motorcycle came loose.96 The "C" clamp had two screws
which held it together. One of these screws was overtorqued or
overtightened during the manufacturing process and developed a
small crack. Later, the motorcycle's vibrations propagated the
crack until the "C" clamp separated. 97 At this separation, the
throttle control came off the handle bars, resulting in the
accident. 98 Is this a manufacturing, design or warning defect?
Professor James Henderson:
It does not matter.
92. See John F. Vargo, Product Liability Law and Product Design: The
Relationship, 237, 242-62 (1989) (A. T. L. A. Annual Convention, Boston).
93. 437 A.2d 700 (1981).
94. Id. at 702.
95. Id.
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Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Whether it matters or not, we are obligated to categorize it to
clarify what rule (negligence or strict liability) applies. It does
not matter from the plaintiff's viewpoint as long as he can prove
a defect. But, it may matter a great deal to the manufacturer con-
cerning his response to the problem. What type of defect is it?
Audience Member
Manufacturing defect.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Almost all engineers, when asked this question, respond in the
same manner. They initially state that it is a manufacturing de-
fect. But, how do you know? What distinguishes the defect cate-
gories? Those of you who have taken torts or products liability
are taught how to distinguish them. What is the difference be-
tween a manufacturing defect and a design defect?99 It is in Pro-
fessor Twerski's book, and he knows what I am talking about. I 0
What is the difference between these two defects? Let us start
with a manufacturing defect. 10 1 How often does it occur accord-
ing to the law?
99. See 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714 (1979). "To find a manufacturing defect the
trier of fact must find that when the product left control of the manufacturer,
the product deviated in some material way from the manufacturer's design
specifications, or performance standards, or from otherwise identical units of
the same product line." Id. To prove a design defect "the trier of fact must
find that at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would
cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would
have prevented those harms .... " Id.
100. See ALvIN S. WEINSTEIN, Er AL., PRODUCrs LIABILrrY AND THE
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUIDE FOR MANAGEmENT, DESIGN, AND
MARKETING, at 34 (John Wiley & Sons eds., 1978) (discussing distinction
between production errors and design flaws).
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Audience Member:
Once in a great while.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Once in a great while. Maybe one, maybe two, who knows. 10 2
But, you automatically said this motorcycle example was a
manufacturing defect. How do you know this? You have a screw
coming apart, right?
Audience Member:
The product failed to live up to its own standard.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
No! You are merely repeating how the law defines the defect.
How do you know it is a manufacturing defect?
Audience Member:
You really do not.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Why not?
Audience Member:
102. See generally Garey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 355 (1982)
(discussing that in the arguments in favor of admitting evidence of prevailing
industry practice on the issue of defectiveness, such evidence can never be
conclusive); Robert A. Bernstein, Evidence of Producer's Due Care in a
Products Liability Action, 25 VAND. L. REV. 513, 519 (1972) (stating that
defendant can avoid liability when plaintiff purchases from defendant but
defect was created after the sale).
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It could be design defect. 103
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
How do you tell the difference between the two? How do you
know? Assume you are an engineer for Harley-Davidson. How
would you discover which type of defect existed in the motorcy-
cle?
Audience Member:
Test or check the screws in other motorcycles.
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Now you are doing something? The defect category is deter-
mined by the frequency of occurrence; quoting Professor Twer-
ski--"It's the frequency of occurrence." 104 However, is there
truly a bright line between a manufacturing defect, a design de-
fect and a failure to warn? In the motorcycle example, it could be
a manufacturing defect as a result of a disgruntled employee who
purposely overtightened a screw during the manufacturing proc-
ess. It could be a design defect as a result of the process chosen
to assemble the product. 105 For example, all or most of the "C"
clamp screws could have been overtorqued with an air pressured
hand tool. But, is this a design defect because of the frequency
(not all but many of the screws could be overtorqued) or a
manufacturing defect? Even assuming only a few of the screws
are overtorqued, some courts may consider it a design because it
was a conscious choice of the type of equipment used on the as-
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Unworkability of
Court-Made Enterprise Liability: A Reply to Geistfeld, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1174, 1178-79 n.22 (1992).
105. See Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 840 (3d. Cir. 1983)
(where plaintiff submitted evidence that "defendants merely spot-checked rear
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sembly line. 106 In addition, the frequency concerning the number
of cracked screws can range from just a few to all of the screws.
At what point does the defect magically change from one of
manufacturing to one of design? There is a huge gray area which
may make a great difference, especially if you use strict liability
for manufacturing defects and negligence for design defects as
Professors Henderson and Twerski recommend. 107
In addition, the response of the manufacturer can differ accord-
ing to the frequency and artificial categorization of defect. If you
categorize the defect as one of design because of the method cho-
sen in assembly, do you spend millions of dollars for a recall
based upon that artificial categorization? What if the frequency is
small or there was just this one defective screw in spite of the
chosen process or assembly?
The whole artificial categorization of defects creates proof
problems and issues that must be litigated when you apply differ-
ent standards (strict liability or negligence) to each separate type
of defect. 108 In reality, such categories of defects are taken from
106. See, e.g., Forest v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, & Co., 791 F. Supp.
1460, 1468 (D. Nev. 1992) (noting that the test for design defect includes
review of designer's "conscious design choices."); Derosa v. Remington Arms
Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that manufacturer is
responsible for "purposeful design choice" that causes injury to user); Prentis,
365 N.W.2d at 183-84 (focusing on quality of manufacturer's "decision" in
design defect cases); but see James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1563 n.143 (1973). According to Professor
Henderson, only a handful of oddly reported cases have exercised judicial
review of manufacturer conscious design choices. Id. These decisions, he
concludes, "do not reflect a general shift in judicial attitudes towards
reviewing conscious design choices so much as they reflect unusual pressures
generated by the peculiar facts of these cases." Id.
107. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1 at 1530-32; James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271-73 (1990);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1333-34 (1991).
108. See Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 646-48 (discussing plaintiff's
problems and benefits of making a prima facie case under either strict liability
standards or negligence); Wertheimer, supra note 8, at 1251. The Supreme
Court of California explained the difference between negligence and strict
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the manufacturer's view, not that of the consumer. The consumer
could care less about such categories since he was injured by a
defective product.
Some scholars take the view that strict liability is appropriate
exclusively for manufacturing defects since you will only impose
liability in a small number of cases (low frequency as a definition
of manufacturing defect).109 However, these scholars state that
strict liability should not be used in design cases since this would
be such a crushing blow on the manufacturer. 110 In the design
case, all the products may be considered defective (frequency
definition of defect). Thus, some scholars state that negligence
should be applied or, as some suggest, no liability should be im-
posed on the manufacturer. 111 A few authors state that a jury
should not second guess what the manufacturer is doing. 112
But, recall what I requested at the beginning of my talk. How
about the other half of the argument and the other half of the
story? It seems to me an amazing argument that it is only ap-
propriate to impose liability in situations where there is a little bit
of danger. In other words, apply strict liability only for manufac-
turing defects where the numbers are small, but reject strict li-
ability where there is more and more danger to the consumer
from design defects. In other words, the more danger presented
to the consumer, the less the liability! I have always had a prob-
lem with this concept.
liability. In negligence the jury looks to the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct, whereas, in strict liability, the jury looks at whether
the product is defective by weighing the costs and benefits (citing Finn v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147, 1150-51 (Cal. 1984)).
109. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1515 (noting that
manufacturing defects "typically occur in only a small percentage of units in a
product line. . . ").
110. See Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 643-49.
111. See Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 643-49.
112. See James A. Henderson Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers'
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Another retrenchment on strict liability is the development of
law and economics and the use of risk-utility1 13 as a sole
standard for liability. Such a standard is nothing but
negligence. 114 The origin of such economic analysis is based
upon a few older negligence cases of Judge Learned Hand. 115
Judge Hand stated that the degree of care demanded of a person
is a product of three factors. 116 All law students here should
know this since you either have been or will be tested on it:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will in-
jure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens,
113. See generally Lake v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 90-1787,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 14238, at *5 (6th Cir. June 27, 1991) (stating that
under the risk-utility test a defectively designed product is a product whose
utility is outweighed by the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream
of commerce. This test involves a balancing test between the chance of harm
and the burden of taking precautions against any harm); Prentis, 365 N.W.2d
at 183 (stating the risk-utility analysis involves an assessment of the decisions
made by manufacturers with respect to the design of their products); Owens v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 379 (1982) (denying liability based
on the risk-utility analysis where plaintiff failed to produce factual evidence
concerning the extent of the risk involved or the proposed alternatives).
114. See Zetlle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 998 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the court has adopted a "pure negligence," risk-utility test in
products liability actions when liability is based on defective design); Prentis,
365 N.W.2d at 184. The court noted:
when a jury decides that the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a
particular design.., it is saying that in choosing the particular design
and cost tradeoffs, the manufacturer exposed the consumer to a greater
risk of danger than he should have. Conceptually, and analytically this
approach bespeaks negligence.
Id.
115. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir.
1947). Judge Learned Hand explained that it "[p]ossibly serves to bring this
notion [of risk utility] into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability
be called P; the injury L and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less than PL." Id.; see also
Prentis 365 N.W.2d at 184 (explaining "[t]he risk utility balancing test is
merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus" in
Carroll Towing Co.).
116. See Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173; Conway v. O'Brien, 111
F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
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and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid
the risk. 117
This quote is usually all you hear from your professors, espe-
cially those who follow law and economics. But, may I continue
the above quote from Judge Hand with the words that are seldom
repeated, but which are, in my opinion, the most important:
All these are practically not susceptible of any quantitative esti-
mate, and the second two are generally not so, even theoreti-
cally. For this reason a solution always involves some prefer-
ence, or choice between incommensurables, and it is consigned
to a jury because their decision is thought most likely to accord
with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied. 118
I would like to continue my criticism of law and economics. In
an upcoming article of mine, there is a statement which includes
an observation by Professor Teuber:
The ability of economists to place an economic value on any-
thing is doubtful. It seems appropriate for a tangible item, such
as property, to be the subject of economic evaluation, such as the
cost-benefit analysis or tort law. Economists experience a great
deal of consternation, however, in trying to place economic or
monetary values on intangible items, such as human life and well
being. Economists' valuation of a human life may range from
$175,000 to $3,200,000. It is not the inability to arrive at a sin-
gle figure that is most disturbing; rather, it is "a coarseness and
grossness of moral feeling, a blunting of sensibility, and a sup-
pression of individual discrimination and gentle-
ness .... Society seems willing to accept a considerable amount
of cost-ineffectiveness when it comes to human values.
119
Professor Teuber's analysis of peoples' attitudes towards risks
describes the inadequacies of the cost-benefit analysis:
117. Conway, 111 F.2d at 612. The court held that since the custom in the
area was to take the curve on the wrong side of the road, defendant's "routine
dereliction" did not constitute gross recklessness and in the "hierarchy of guilt
such carelessness did not stand high" enough to allow plaintiff to sue under
Vermont's guest statute. Id. at 613.
118. Id. at 612.
119. John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
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Because it fails to respect the distinctiveness of people's re-
sponses to risks, or to do justice to the morally significant ways
in which risks can be distributed, or to give proper weight to the
importance we attach to human life in situations of felt urgency,
or to capture the special significance of our concern for auton-
omy and rights, cost-benefit analysis cannot yield the same result
as individual consent. For these reasons, we should not be per-
suaded to allow cost-benefit analysis to determine public policy--
to do, as it were, our talking for us.
12 0
Thank you for your time.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you Mr. Vargo. Professor Twerski spoke about the in-
troduction of strict products liability as being a liberating an-
them. 121 1 wonder if the plaintiffs' attorneys have not ground out
the anthem in some respects. In listening to the very persuasive
presentation of Mr. Vargo, I was thinking back to some of the
cases that I presided over more than eleven years ago.
It seemed to me that every products liability case which came
before me had a products liability claim, whether based on a de-
fective design or failure-to-warn, and a negligence claim. In
pretrial conferences, I urged the plaintiffs' attorneys to simplify
their cases -- make them sparkle a little. They replied, "No
Judge, we can't give up any of the theories." They refuse to give
up the negligence theory because they want the jury to think that
the defendant is an evil person. They want to present that evi-
dence even if it is not convincing to win on negligence grounds.
It may win hearts, even if it does not win minds. So what hap-
pens? The cases end up a muddle of confused facts and confused
issues. There is more emphasis on negligence and less emphasis
on strict liability. You know the old saying, "If you don't use it,
you lose it." I think that is almost what has happened in many
120. Id. at 1628-29 (citing Andreas Teuber, Justifying Risk, DAEDALUS, at
247 ( Fall 1990)).
121. See Aaron D. Twerski, Front A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10
ToURo L. REv. 4, 9 (1993).
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aspects in the products liability area. Whether it should be that
way is another question.
As I told Professor Twerski, I have a question for him. He
raised the question of whether or not we should have such a thing
as a drug design claim.122 I draw on my own experience of a
case that I tried involving Quadragen, a vaccination for children.
The case was settled just before it went to the jury.
Because children do not like to get needles stuck in them, the
drug manufacturers came up with the idea of combining the four
main vaccines - mumps, chicken pox, measles, and polio - and
putting them into a single vaccine. Apparently what happened, by
combining the four, was that one of the vaccines destroyed the
polio vaccine. As a result, the child got polio and became para-
lyzed. I was told at the trial that the "four-in-one" vaccine has
since been abandoned. Now they have a "three-in-one," plus a
separate polio vaccine. This was a case where the design was to
put all four together. The manufacturers could have been done
separately, but they created the "four in one" vaccine, apparently
for the economic value of it. It seemed to me that that was clearly
a design defect. Obviously, they would not have manufactured
the drug in this way had they known what the consequences
were. So my question is, "Isn't this a good example of a design
defect case?"
Professor Aaron Twerski:
My answer to that would be that we are thinking very heavily
about the logistics and how to frame the drug design case. So, I
think this very well may be a design defect case. If I were to take
the opposing side on that issue, and I am not inclined to do it as a
matter of principle, but if I were to do it, I think the contention
could very well be on warning grounds as well.
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
How could they warn if they did not know it was going to hap-
pen?
Professor Aaron Twerski:
The question with regard to design will have the same issue as
warning; whether or not in the whole drug field we will have li-
ability for unforseeable risks. In the design field, it may be that
the benefit of the "four-in-one" is something that ought not to
have been done until the testing was letter perfect. So I think this
may very well have been a better design case than a warning
case.
Quadragen was the first case in American legal history of de-
sign litigation for drugs. Thereafter, there has been remarkably
little design litigation. That does not mean they are not legitimate
cases and that they should not be accounted for by appropriate
rules. In short, I tend to agree with you that there should be a
well-fashioned rule dealing with drug design litigation.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
John Vargo used much of your materials against you. Would
you care to respond to Mr. Vargo?
Professor Aaron Twerski:
Interestingly John, much of what you said I agree with. I hope
that much of what you pointed out will find its way into the Re-
statement comments. Let me tell you what I disagree with. Num-
ber one, your example out here. 123 As I mentioned before, there
are a broad range of cases that have a res ipsa like quality. 124 It
123. Mr. Vargo displayed a hand drawn diagram depicting a Harley
Davidson handlebar in order to illustrate a defective throttle clamp. See supra
notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 121, at 13-14.
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does not make a difference whether you call it design defect,
manufacturing defect, or failure to warn. This is one of them.
This is a Henningsen125 type case, and we ought to be able to ar-
ticulate it, and I think we have.
Secondly, the distinction between failure to warn, design and
manufacturing defect is so deeply entrenched that it works in
99.9% of the cases. You pointed to something I wrote, 126 and I
stand behind it. I wrote that at the extreme, any distinction that
you make in the entirety of the law breaks down. 127 There are no
such things as perfect categories. The question is: are they good
and are they sound. This one is both good and sound. It has
worked in literally thousands of cases. I think you are right, the
other situation ought to be accounted for, and I think we can ac-
count for it.
With regard to Beshada,128 we have done our homework. I
know of only five jurisdictions, that I can think of right now, that
follow Beshada. New Jersey is not one of them because it backed
down off of Beshada. 129 Beshada suggested that in a failure to
warn setting, the court should apply the test, if you knew then
what you know now, would you market the product the same
way. 130 I think Hawaii, Massachusetts, Missouri, Pennsylvania
and Washington do the same. 131 On any theory of a restatement
125. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
126. See supra text accompanying note 100.
127. See ALvIN S. WEINSTEIN, Er AL., PRODUCTS LABumrry AND rHE
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT, DESIGN, AND
MARKETING, at 34 (John Wiley & Sons eds. 1978) (discussing the distinction
between production errors and design flaws).
128. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982)
(consolidated actions brought against manufacturers and distributors of
asbestos products). In Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
manufacturer who could not have known of a danger at the time of marketing
can nevertheless be liable for failure to warn. Id. at 549.
129. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984)
(limiting the rule in Beshada to asbestos cases); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463
A.2d 298, 301 (N.J. 1983) (holding that state of the art evidence is admissible
in defective design cases).
130. See Beshada, 447 A.2d at 544-49.
131. See Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw.
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of law, if you are working forty-five to five, that is irresponsible.
I do not think you can do it, and I do not think we ought to do it.
I think there is a reason why forty-seven courts have refused to
apply this standard. It is unfair. Not only is it unfair to the
manufacturer, it is unfair to consumers as well because it has
devastating effects. It drives older and more experienced compa-
nies out of the market and favors new entrants into the market in
an unconscionable way. It is neither a fair test, nor a sensible
test.132 The fact of the matter is that these are technological
harms in which no one can do anything about. We are dealing
with a framework in the law of torts which says that unless you
have a good reason for transferring costs, you let the losses fall
where they may. We have never had a tort system in this country
which pays no attention to the terms in force, and I do not think
we are about to start one right now.
On the other hand, it seems to me that the assumed knowledge
concept is a good one in many cases like Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co. 133 That is the kind of case where I think I agree
with you that we ought to assume knowledge. Why the devil
doesn't he know? The principles of physics have been around
since Newton. Why should we not charge him with that knowl-
edge? Why should we make plaintiffs jump through hoops? I do
not think we ought to. I think there is a way of saying that. On
the other hand, to jump from that premise to the liability in the
context of Beshada, that there is liability for scientifically un-
strict products liability claim); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 (Mass.
1984); Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) (stating that the "law in Missouri holds that state of the art evidence has
no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim; the sole subject of inquiry
is the defective condition of the product and not the manufacturer's
knowledge, negligence or fault."); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d
326 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 818
P.2d 1337, 1340 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (holding that the test for inadequate
warnings requires no showing of foreseeability).
132. For criticism of the Beshada reasoning see Victor Schwartz, The Post-
Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable
Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983).
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